Introduction

Two Russian men have broken their silence, revealing secret operations they carried out inside Russia for Ukraine's intelligence services. Their accounts lift the lid on a shadowy campaign of sabotage, surveillance, and covert action aimed at undermining the Kremlin's war effort.

What Happened

Ivan, one of the insiders, claims to have helped coordinate drone strikes on strategic bombers and munitions factories on Russian soil. His work involved scouting locations, hiding drone components, and assembling devices that could destroy assets worth millions with a single impact. He has faced the constant threat of terrorism charges and decades in prison if caught. Their work operates beyond the front lines, deep inside Russian cities and factories.

Foma, living in exile in Poland, runs a network of undercover volunteers inside Russia. He supplies Ukraine's GUR with intelligence on high-level military officers, providing detailed files that include photos, dates of birth, and vehicle information. His volunteers are trained to trail targets without drawing attention, and they never participate in the attacks themselves.

Why This Matters

The revelations offer a rare glimpse into the hidden side of the conflict, where ordinary Russians risk everything to strike back against a regime they oppose. The operations highlight how intelligence warfare has moved beyond battlefields into cities, factories, and the daily lives of military personnel. Such internal operations reshape the understanding of modern conflict.

Ukraine has long acknowledged using covert agents and drone strikes inside Russia, but first-hand accounts from operatives like Ivan and Foma provide the clearest picture yet of the methods, risks, and human cost involved. The accounts also raise questions about security gaps, the reach of foreign intelligence, and the lengths to which individuals will go to challenge authoritarian power.

Key Takeaways

  • Two Russian insiders, Ivan and Foma, secretly worked for Ukraine's GUR to conduct sabotage and surveillance inside Russia.
  • Ivan focused on locating and preparing drone attacks on military airfields and factories, risking severe punishment.
  • Foma trained and managed a network of volunteers who surveilled senior officers and passed intelligence to Ukrainian handlers.
  • Both men operate without direct participation in attacks, emphasizing they only provide intelligence.
  • Ideological opposition to Putin's regime motivates their actions, not financial gain.
  • Operational security is strict: no group chats, no internet footprints, and careful vetting of every target.
  • Officials acknowledge the difficulty in verifying the full scope of such internal operations.

Conclusion

The stories of Ivan and Foma illustrate the personal risks and strategic calculations behind a covert war fought within Russia's borders. As the conflict continues, such internal sabotage may play an increasingly visible role in shaping outcomes. Whether these operations lead to lasting change or greater repression remains to be seen, but the accounts confirm that resistance from within is already underway.